## Incident Summary #II-1604791-2023 (#39000) (FINAL)

	Incident Date		September 14, 2023
SUPPORTING INFORMATION	Location		Mission
	Regulated industry sector		Electrical - Low voltage electrical system (30V to 750V)
	Impact Damage Injury	Qty injuries	0
		Injury description	N/A
		Injury rating	None
		Damage description	Outer jacket burned, crimp from utility melted and minor fire damage to the wooden building structure and wooden service post. Damaged overhead consumer service cable insulation and utility connection point.
		Damage rating	Minor
	Incident rating		Minor
	Incident overview		The connection point from the utility supply conductor to the main consumer service conductor failed and ignited accumulated wood dust between the roof and soffit area at a pallet manufacturing facility.
INVESTIGATION	Site, system and components		<ul> <li>Site:</li> <li>A pallet manufacturing facility with lighting and wood manufacturing equipment such as saws, compressors, dust collectors.</li> <li>Components: <ul> <li>400 Amp, 120/208 Volt, 3 Phase, overhead service.</li> <li>Appears to be 4/0 AWG single conductor, armoured cables installed from the service connection point to the 400 Amp fused service switch located inside the building.</li> <li>Utility quadruplex cable supply service cable installed overhead from the utility pole to the connection point at the building.</li> <li>Type H compression crimp between the supply service and consumer service conductors.</li> <li>6 X 6 treated wood service cable support post.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Normal Operation: <ul> <li>The compression crimp provides a connection point between the utility overhead conductors and the consumer service conductors.</li> <li>Service conductor connections that are not properly installed or become loose can cause connections to degrade resulting in overheating.</li> <li>It has been confirmed this type of connector is approved for copper to aluminum connections.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	Failure scenario(s)		Over time, the overhead utility supply conductors and service conductors became loose and heat was likely building up eventually to the point where the crimp failed. When the crimp melted, and the service conductor overheated molten aluminum and copper likely fell into the opening around the service post. Wood dust may have been collecting there and was ignited.

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	Facts and evidence	<ul> <li>Forklift operator statement: <ul> <li>While driving the forklift through the yard he observed smoke coming out from the roof line below the service cables.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Fire fighter statement: <ul> <li>When the soffit was removed there was a pile of smoldering wood dust between the roof and the soffit in the immediate area directly below the melted service connection.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Safety Officer(s) observations: <ul> <li>The area had little to no precipitation in the month prior to and at the time of the incident.</li> <li>Wood dust was built up on the roof. The wood dust in the area was very dry.</li> <li>Signs of melting copper and aluminum on the cable and compression crimp.</li> <li>Fire damage on the post between the roof and the soffit observed.</li> <li>Utility indicated the crimped service connections were made in 2002.</li> <li>After the incident and service repair load testing was conducted by the site operating permit electrician and was measured at 400A inrush, and 185A running current. Phase loading was determined to be relatively balanced.</li> <li>Dry wood dust was observed.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		
	Causes and contributing factors	It's likely that loose service conductor connections combined with loading on the service conductors overheated and melted the service conductor connections, copper and aluminum service conductors, and conductor insulation. Hot material dripping into the roof/soffit area ignited dry wood dust. A contributing factor may have been warm dry weather, prior to the incident, drying the accumulated wood dust that had collected inside the soffit area below the melted connections.		





Image 2 – Pallet manufacturing facility.



Image 3 – Gaps for dust to enter between the roof and the soffit.



Image 4 – Soffit removed by the fire department.



Image 5 – Dust accumulated on the roof.



Image 6 – Molten drips and melted insulation.



Image 7 - Failed crimp.



Image 8 - No significant rain in the weeks prior to the incident. (*Taken from https://www.wunderground.com/calendar/ca/abbotsford/CYXX/date/2023-9*)

