Appendix C: Site Description and Scene Documentation

The photos contained in this appendix were taken or collected as part of Technical Safety BC's investigation and are included to supplement the discussion in the report.

- C0: Site, System and Component Descriptions
- C1: Outside Arena
- C2: Mechanical Room
- C3: Curling Brine System Chiller
- C4: Ammonia Compressors
- C5: Separated Brine System Coupling
- C6: Brine Spray
- C7: Figure Skating Storage Room

C0: Site, System and Component Descriptions

An overview of the following site, system and components is helpful to understand aspects of the Fernie Memorial Arena, the refrigeration system and the components involved with the incident.

Class T Machinery Room

The mechanical room at the Fernie Memorial Arena that contained the refrigeration equipment is a 'Class T Machinery Room'. Class T machinery rooms are designed as non-occupied spaces with restricted access. Their objective is to house refrigerant and system components while providing a degree of isolation from the occupied spaces in the event of a refrigerant leak. Access is restricted to authorized persons and limited to necessary operation and maintenance activities.

Ammonia sensors, alarms, room ventilation and the room configuration is designed to alert operators and limit leaking refrigerant from entering the occupied spaces. Ventilation air for the room is provided to and from the mechanical room directly from the outside. Controls are provided to shut the refrigeration system down and display the amount of ammonia measured by the ammonia detection system outside of the mechanical room.



Ammonia Refrigeration and Brine Cooling System at Fernie Memorial Arena

The Fernie Memorial Arena utilized an indirect vented closed compression refrigeration system to cool the arena and curling ice surfaces. This system uses a refrigerant to remove heat from a secondary coolant in the heat exchanger or chiller. The process evaporates the refrigerant which is then compressed and condensed back into a liquid to be re-circulated back to the chiller. The secondary coolant remains a liquid and is pumped to the floor and back to the chiller to be cooled again as shown in Figure C0-1 below.




Figure C0-1: Ammonia Refrigeration and Brine Systems at Fernie Memorial Arena. Refrigerant is shown blue and coolant is shown green.

Ammonia was the refrigerant utilized to cool two independent brine coolant systems that circulated cold brine to the arena and curling floors. The two brine systems were independent and with a dedicated chiller for each.

All of the ammonia, refrigeration system and mechanical components are located in the mechanical room, with the exception of the condenser and emergency/pressure relief discharge piping & diffuser, which are located immediately outside for functional purposes. Only the chilled brine is circulated within occupied spaces of the building.

Ammonia

Ammonia is a common refrigerant due to its thermal properties, relatively low environmental impact and low cost as compared to other refrigerants. Ammonia boils at -33°C when unpressurized (atmospheric pressure of 101.3 kilopascals (kPa) (14.7 psi)) and condenses from vapour to liquid if pressurized to 1166 kPa (169 psi) at 30°C.

Ammonia has a high expansion ratio of over 800:1 meaning that a small volume of liquid when vapourized will command a large volume at room temperature. For example, a one litre (1L) open bucket of liquid ammonia (approximately 1.5lbs) at -33°C, if vapourized will expand to occupy a volume of over 800L at standard room temperature and atmospheric pressure. Ammonia expanding into a space will have a cooling effect before ambient temperatures will complete the expansion.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



APPENDIX C

Page 2 of 28 Appendix The density of ammonia vapour is approximately 60% of the density of air and will naturally rise toward the ceiling within a room or up and away from the ground. The movement of ammonia vapour will however be highly affected by air currents and pressures and other outside meteorological conditions.

Ammonia is a colourless gas with a strong odour. It is very toxic, corrosive and flammable at concentrations between 15.5% and 27% with an ignition temperature of 650°Celsius (C). The Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety <u>ammonia fact sheet</u> contains additional information.

Exposure	Signs and Symptoms			
(ppm ammonia in air)				
50	Irritation to eyes, nose and throat (2 hours exposure)			
100	Rapid eye and respiratory tract irritation			
250	Tolerable by most people (30–60 minutes exposure)			
700	Immediately irritating to eyes and throat			
>1,500	Pulmonary oedema, coughing, laryngospasm			
2,500-4,500	00 Fatal (30 minutes exposure)			
5,000-10,000	000-10,000 Rapidly fatal due to airway obstruction, may also			
	cause skin damage			
Table C0-1: Toxic effects following acute exposure to ammonia by inhalation fr				

<u>Ammonia Toxicological Overview</u> – Public Health England

Exposure Limits to ammonia are identified by WorkSafeBC as follows:

Exposure Level (ppm)	Exposure Limit	
25	Maximum allowable concentration averaged over an 8- hour period	
35	Maximum allowable short-term exposure (15 minutes)	
300	Immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)	

Table C0-2: Ammonia Exposure Limits


Brine

The coolant that is pumped through the chillers and out to the curling and arena floors at the Fernie Memorial Arena was a 22% calcium chloride (salt) brine solution. This brine solution can be chilled to temperatures of approximately -23°C without freezing. A corrosion inhibitor is added to the brine solution to help counter the corrosive effects that the calcium chloride solution has on the carbon steel piping and chiller components.



Curling Brine Chiller

The curling brine chiller is a shell and tube heat exchanger that transfers heat energy from one liquid to another without mixing the two. The Fernie Memorial Arena incorporated two-pass shell and tube chillers for both the arena and curling systems. The 'warm' brine is pumped into the chiller where it splits and flows through numerous tubes to increase the heat transfer surface area contact.



The chiller tubes are contained within a cylindrical shell where cold liquid ammonia is

fed into the shell bottom through a solenoid and expansion valve. A level controller controls the operation of the solenoid valve to maintain the liquid level at a pre-determined setting. High-level cut-off float switches and surge vessels protect the compressors from exposure to liquid ammonia.

Shell pressure on the ammonia side is typically maintained between 15 psi and 35 psi by the compressor settings. Liquid ammonia on the outer surface of the tubes receives heat from brine circulating through the tubes, resulting in flashing of liquid ammonia into vapour on the shell side and colder brine on the secondary side.

The heat transfer process within the chiller results with warm brine entering the tube side, being chilled by the ammonia on the shell side and then cold brine exiting to be pumped back out to cool the ice floor of the curling rink or arena.

Brine Expansion Tank

Brine systems incorporate an expansion tank that is mounted at an elevated location. The brine expansion tank allows for the liquid volume within the system to expand and contract during various operating conditions and ensures a liquid presence and small pressure at the pump inlet.

The brine expansion tanks are open to the mechanical room atmosphere to allow for trapped air to escape and to ensure that the brine system does not become pressurized. The brine system is not required to be designed to withhold pressure and may only be anticipated to experience pressures associated with secondary coolant circulation.

Brine System Pipe Couplings

Within the mechanical room, the brine system piping was of carbon steel construction and welded at joint locations. There was one pipe segment on the curling brine system that utilized straight couplings rather than welded joints to connect the pipe to the system. One coupling was installed in a vertical orientation where the fluid exited the curling chiller and the second coupling joined the other end of the pipe segment to the brine pipe that was routed to the curling floor. This pipe segment contained two 90 degree bends that routed the pipe from the chiller, towards the floor and under the other chiller.



The straight line pipe coupling forms a compression fit to seal in liquid however it does not act as a structural member of the piping system. Piping utilizing straight line compression fit couplings must be structurally supported on either side of the coupling to prevent pipe movement or separation. The current manufacturers catalogue associated with the couplings used at the Fernie Memorial Arena contained the caution shown in Figure C0-3. A 1980 catalogue contained the following statement: *Proper restraint of pipes, especially plastic pipes, is necessary to resist pull out, due to pressure, temperature and surge effects, among other forces.*

Mixing of liquid ammonia and brine

Ammonia (NH3) has a strong affinity for water, meaning it readily reacts chemically to form an ammonium hydroxide (NH4 + OH) solution. The chemical reaction is exothermic, producing heat as a by-product of the chemical reaction. Once the water becomes saturated and cannot absorb additional ammonia, any added ammonia will readily expand out of the solution or form a liquid ammonia layer on top depending upon the temperature and pressure conditions. The chemical reaction is reversible and ammonia will 'off-gas' from an ammonium hydroxide solution and the 'off-gas' rate will increase with the addition of heat.



Couplings do not prevent pipe pullout. Suitable restraint should be used when required.

Figure C0-3: Caution statement contained in the coupling manufacturer's catalogue.



C1: Outside Arena




Figure C1-1: Plan view of Fernie Memorial Arena and Curling Club




Photo C1-1: Outside arena view looking at mechanical room door on October 18, 2017.





Photo C1-2: Outside arena looking at the mechanical room door (blue), furnace room (beige) and fire box (red)



C2: Mechanical Room




Figure C2-1: Plan view of mechanical room



Ammonia Release October 17, 2017





Photo C2-2: Arena pump, standby pump, curling	Photo C2-3: View looking onto the east wall
pump. These pumps are visible in the	showing Compressors 1 and 2. The compressors
background of photo C2-1.	are visible in the foreground of photo C2-1.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca






Photo C2-4: Looking toward the north wall between the arena and curling chillers. Receiver is installed below the curling chiller.



C3 Curling Brine System Chiller



Photo C3-1: Curling chiller with the brine inlet and outlet piping removed. The photo below shows the curling chiller with its head removed, exposing the tube sheet.



Photo C3-2: Curling chiller, head removed. The brine inlet/outlet tube sheet at the north end of the chiller. Debris and residue is visible on the tubes.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017





Photo C3-3: Return end tube sheet (south end) of the curling chiller. Debris and residue is also visible on the tubes and sheet.



Photo C3-4: Curling chiller, tube sheet upon opening in January 2018 showing residue.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017







Photo C3-5: Close up of upper tubes from return end of chiller upon opening in January 2018.



www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017





Photo C3-8 and Photo C3-9 (below): Chiller with shell section and top three tubes cut away at return end – white scale indicates brine leak into shell (ammonia) side of heat exchanger. Below shows leaking tube removed with scale deposits and spray patterns on adjacent tubes.







Photo C3-10 (above) and Photo C3-11 (below): Above shows evidence of spray from tube (brine) side into shell (ammonia) side. Photo C3-11 shows close-up of inside surface of the tube and leak location showing erosion of metal from ammonia leak into tube.



INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



APPENDIX C

Page **15** of **28** Appendix



Photo C3-12: Curling chiller (with insulation) showing the ammonia liquid inlet configuration. Valve positions are noted in Appendix B.



Photo C3-13: Manufacturer's nameplate – Curling System Brine Chiller – Fernie Memorial Arena. Date of manufacture identified as 1986. This chiller was approximately 31 years old at the time of failure

CERTIFIED BY CE



C4 Ammonia compressors



Photo C4-1: Compressor #2. Vestibule door and Compressor #1 in the background.




Photo C4-2: Compressor #2 (Compressor #1 similar) with valve covers removed. The lower discharge valves showed salt crystal build up. The upper discharge valves had less salt crystals on the discharge side of the valves and more crystals were present on top of the pistons (see Photo C4-4).





Photo C4-3: Close up of the lower valves in photo C4-2. Build-up of salt crystals from brine around the valves compressors #1 and #2.



Photo C4-4: Salt deposits/residue from the brine on one of the compressor's upper piston

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



C5 Separated Coupling



Photo C5-1 and Photo C5-2: Separated brine system coupling.

Photos C5-1 and C5-2 show the coupling dislodged from the piping. The report discusses the configuration of the piping components observed after the incident.



C6: Brine spray



Photo C6-1: SE corner of the mechanical room ceiling (above the receiver, curling chiller and surge drum).	Photo C6-2: SW corner of the mechanical room (above the door to vestibule). Brine spray is seen on the ceiling and walls below. The arrow indicatos blue/turguoise discolouration on the
	indicates blue/turquoise discolouration on the
	copper pipe from exposure to ammonia.





Photos C6-3 and **Photo C6-4**: View of opened books contaminated with brine spray on a shelf on the mechanical room's south wall. Note the shadowing from spray, suggesting that the spray was directional and projected at and around different components (not evenly misted or distributed throughout the mechanical room).



Rochester Midland Co	C		ROCHESTER MIDLAND CANADA FORPY 143 Mills Read, Ajax, ON L1S 2H2 Tel: 905-619-6738 Fax: 905-619-8693 www.nochestermidjand.com
CUSTOMER: LOCATIONAD: \$7180 LOCATIONAD: \$7180 LOCATIONAD: LITIE PRODUCT USED: Brigghip			SALES REP: CC: Returnment com Returnment com Returnment com PO+ 4506820314 JOB #
ANALYSIS.		TEST RESULTS.	RECOMMENDER CONTROL RANGES
TOTAL IRON IS Fe	ppm	310	All pput
TOTAL SUSPENDED SO	LIDS	\$8.4	< 1000 ppm
SPECIFIC GRAVITY @4	0°C	1.195	1.20 - 1.22 -
FREEZING POINT	Ť	-5.5	-5.5 % to -11.6F°
CALCIUM CHLORIDE	1	a + 121.5	21.5% to 23.3%
pH		10.08	9.0+10.0 Brinchib
COLOUR CLARITY ,		AMBER	8.5 - 9.3 Chostrate Clear
and the second second second second	ppin	*3320	MI
BRINEHIB	ppm	. 220	4,000 - 5,000 ppm
CUROMATE IS CO.	nom .	NAL	1600 ppm Caronate
COMMENTS and RECOM Brinehib reading is low. Pk Iltration on this system assi * A significant amount of a	ase ado 2	TAILS OF Dratemore	r 1000 gallons of system capacity. Please ensure good mpla. Please check for possistion engement testage

Photo C6-5: Brine Analysis Report for the curling system dated June 6, 2017 found in the mechanical room. Identical copies of this report were obtained from the City of Fernie, Cimco and the testing laboratory (Rochester Midland Corporation).

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017

Cimco Recommendation -Retest as ammonia may be a false positive as there was no odor at time of sample and this concentration odor would be present. -Add 2.5 pales of brine hib . -Filtration must be increased.

Photo C6-6: Paper found in the mechanical room near the brine analysis report dated June 6, 2017.




Photo C6-7: Copper locks showing blue corrosion due to ammonia exposure.

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017





Photo C6-8: Exposed copper piping showing corrosion from ammonia exposure. Brine spray is also visible on the wall and floor surfaces.

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



APPENDIX C

Page **25** of **28** Appendix



Photo C6-9: Projected contents of the brine piping from the separating coupling.



Photo C6-10: Door between mechanical room and vestibule showing gap under door.

Photo C6-11: Door between vestibule and arena did not incorporate a seal at bottom.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



C7: Figure skating storage room




Figure C7-1: The emergency discharge piping (red) extends from the receiver (in the mechanical room) to the firebox on the building's exterior. The piping is routed through the figure skating storage room and can be seen in the photo below (along the wall parallel to the ceiling).




Photo C7-1: Figure skating storage room

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



APPENDIX C

Page 27 of 28 Appendix



Photo C7-2: Close up of the emergency discharge piping from the mechanical room into the figure skating storage room. The photo shows a costume suspended from the piping.



Photo C7-3: Discharge pipe was supported mid-span to ceiling structure by a thin wire.

INVESTIGATION REPORT www.technicalsafetybc.ca

Ammonia Release October 17, 2017



APPENDIX C

Page 28 of 28 Appendix