

October 11th, 2018

Australian Cyber Conference

SANS

Continuous Security: Exploring the DevOps Toolchain

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C U R R I C U L U M

Get the right training to build secure applications.

PLATFORM SECURITY

DEV531

Defending Mobile Applications
Security Essentials

DEV541

Secure Coding in Java/JEE
GSSP-JAVA

DEV544

Secure Coding in .NET
GSSP-NET

CORE

STH.DEVELOPER

Application Security Awareness
Modules

DEV522

Defending Web Applications
Security Essentials
GWEB

DEV534

Secure DevOps:
A Practical Introduction

DEV540

Secure DevOps and Cloud
Application Security

SPECIALIZATION

SEC542

Web App Penetration Testing
and Ethical Hacking
GWAPT

SEC642

Advanced Web App Penetration
Testing and Ethical Hacking

ASSESSMENT

AppSec CyberTalent
Assessment

sans.org/appsec-assessment



@sansappsec

software-security.sans.org

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 - Security assessments: DevSecOps, cloud, source code, web apps, mobile apps
- Application Security Curriculum Manager, SANS Institute
 - SANS Certified Instructor
 - Contributing author of DEV540, DEV531, and DEV544
- Education & Training
 - Iowa State M.S. Information Assurance, B.S. Computer Engineering
 - AWS Certified Developer, CISSP, GSSP-Java, GSSP-.NET, GWAPT
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Agenda

- **Introduction**
- Pre-Commit
- Commit


Introduction

1. **State of DevOps**
2. **Security Challenges**
3. **DevSecOps Toolchain**

Current State of DevOps

High velocity and low cost of change enables DevOps organizations to run continuous experiments, respond to customers, pivot quickly


- Deploy 46x more frequently,
- 440x shorter lead times (<1 hour vs <1 month)
- Recover from failures 96x faster
- Spend 50% less time remediating security issues



Current State of DevOps Security

But... HPE study of DevOps teams in 2016 found that

- **Security is being short-changed**
 - Only 20% do security in development/delivery
 - 38% still depend on pen testing or other pre-production gate reviews
 - 25% rely on network defenses
 - 17% are doing nothing for security
- **Security is seen as somebody else's problem**



DevOps culture **conflicts with traditional security culture:**

- Top down risk management instead of team-based decision making
- Need to know restrictions vs extended information sharing
- Zero failure vs fail fast and fail forward
- Limiting change – Security is always ready to say “No!”

Resources to help understand (and create) DevOps culture

- The Phoenix Project
- Five Dysfunctions of a Team
- Lean Enterprise
- Building a DevOps Culture


There are different, but compatible, memes around including security in DevOps. They all share common principles and goals:

- Make security a first-class problem and the security team a first-class participant in DevOps
- Increase trust and transparency between dev, ops, and sec
- Integrate security practices and ideas into DevOps culture, and DevOps into security culture
- Wire security into DevOps toolchains and workflows to incrementally improve security




DevSecOps cycles through 5 key phases:

- SANS DevSecOps Toolchain poster lists several OSS tools for each phase
- Written by Ben Allen, Jim Bird, Eric Johnson, & Frank Kim
- <https://sans.org/u/zAi>



DevSecOps Security Controls

Breaking down the security controls in each DevSecOps phase:



Agenda


- Introduction
- **Pre-Commit**
- Commit

Pre-Commit Stage

- 1. Threat Modeling**
- 2. IDE Security Plugins**
- 3. Pre-Commit Hooks**
- 4. Peer Code Reviews**

DevSecOps Pre-Commit Phase

Applying security controls before code is written and committed:



#1 Threat Modeling

Rapid Risk Assessments

Start with a high-level risk assessment for new systems/services

- Classify the data: legal and compliance requirements, sensitivity, etc.
- Focus on platform, language, and framework risks: is the team using well-understood tools, or something new, novel?
- Determine a risk rating and next steps: threat modeling, control gate requirements, security training ...

Re-run risk assessment if/when team makes major change to design or data

PayPal risk questionnaire for new apps/services

Mozilla Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) model – 30-minute review

Threat Modeling in DevOps

Iterative and lightweight threat modeling based on risk: early in design, or as major changes are made

Examine trust boundaries and assumptions in architecture

Ask these questions when you are making changes:

1. Are you changing the attack surface (new entry/exit points, new user role...)?
2. Are you changing the technology stack or application security controls?
3. Are you adding confidential/sensitive data?
4. Have threat agents changed – are we facing new risks?

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- OWASP User Security Stories
 - <https://github.com/OWASP/user-security-stories>
- OWASP Application Security Verification Standards
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project
- Mozilla's Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA)
 - https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/risk/rapid_risk_assessment.html
- OWASP Threat Dragon
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Threat_Dragon



PRE-COMMIT



THREAT MODELING

Threat Modeling Example

Mozilla's rapid risk assessment guidance and Google Doc provide a blueprint for 30 minute RRAs:

RRA for <service name>

Service Owner(s)	
Owner's Director	
Service Data Classification	
Highest Risk Impact	

Service Notes

*How does the service work? Do we have diagrams, demos, examples? Is the service in production yet?
Can we break this service down per components?*

RRA Request bug:

[Vendor questionnaire](#) (if vendor):

#2 IDE Security Plugins

IDE Security Plugins

Immediate, incremental scanning in each developer's IDE catches security mistakes as code is being changed/saved by the developer

- Security becomes part of the engineering workflow
- Shifting as far left as possible in the kill chain
- Must have low false positive rates (important)
- Run high value rules and disable noisy rules that distract engineers

IDE Security Plugin Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- **FindSecurityBugs** plugin for Eclipse and IntelliJ
 - <http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/>
- **Puma Scan** plugin for Visual Studio
 - <https://github.com/pumasecurity/puma-scan>
- Microsoft's **DevSkim** for VSCode, Sublime, Visual Studio
 - <https://github.com/Microsoft/DevSkim>
- **SonarLint** plugins for Visual Studio, IntelliJ, and Eclipse
 - <https://www.sonarlint.org/>


PRE-COMMIT

IDE SECURITY
PLUGINS

Note: IDE plugins are also available for most commercial SAST products

IDE Security Plugin Example

Puma Scan identifying a JSON deserialization vulnerability:



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Visual Studio IDE with a REST client file named `RestClient.cs` open. The code is for a `WidgetTown.Utilities.RestClient` and shows a `Get<T>(string endpoint)` method. The code disables certificate validation and uses `HttpClient` to make a GET request. The response is read as a string and then deserialized using `JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<T>` with `JsonSerializerSettings`. The `TypeNameHandling` property is set to `TypeNameHandling.All`. A security warning from Puma Scan is displayed at the bottom, indicating that `TypeNameHandling.All` is a vulnerability because it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code and perform denial of service attacks.

```
20 {
21     //Disable certificate validation for test / dev environments
22     handler.ServerCertificateValidationCallback += (sender, cert, chain, sslPolicyErrors
23     using (var client = new HttpClient(handler))
24     {
25         var request = client.GetAsync(string.Format("{0}{1}", BASE_URL, endpoint)).Conti
26         {
27             var result = response.Result;
28             var json = result.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
29             json.Wait();
30             item = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<T>(json.Result
31             , new JsonSerializerSettings()
32             {
33                 TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All
34             }
35         }
36     }
37 }
38 }
```

Warning: `TypeNameHandling.All` is a vulnerability. Always include the .NET type name when serializing. The Newtonsoft JSON `DeserializeObject` method can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code and perform denial of service attacks if the `TypeNameHandling` setting is set to a value other than `None`. Show potential fixes (Alt+Enter or Ctrl+.)

#3 | Pre-Commit Hooks

Pre-Commit Hooks

- Git Hooks automatically run scripts at different points in workflows
 - Local: **pre-commit**, prepare-commit, commit, post-commit, post-checkout, pre-rebase
 - Server-side: **pre-receive**, update, **post-receive**
- Implement team-wide workflow policies, or check code for problems
- CAUTION: Repo owner can alter/uninstall hooks – so hooks cannot be enforced

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Open source frameworks to manage hooks for different languages + tools
 - Yelp pre-commit framework
 - Overcommit
- Pre-commit tools for scanning code:
 - AWS Labs git-secrets (<https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets>)
 - Talisman (<https://github.com/thoughtworks/talisman>)
 - Autho repo-supervisor (<https://github.com/autho/repo-supervisor>)

PRE-COMMIT

PRE-COMMIT HOOKS

Pre-Commit Hook Example

AWS git-secrets blocking a commit that contains an access key and secret key id:

```
1 $ git commit -m "testing git-secrets"
2
3 Web/Licensing/appsettings.json:5:
4     "AccessKey": "AKIAJNQ7C2FCRR6B4VWA",
5 Web/Licensing/appsettings.json:6:
6     "SecretKey": "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"
7
8 [ERROR] Matched one or more prohibited patterns
```

#4 | Peer Code Reviews

Peer Code Reviews

Disciplined peer code reviews are a fundamental engineering practice in DevOps: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Etsy, Twitter...

- Review for functional correctness (especially in high-risk code) and defensive coding
- Ensure that code takes advantage of secure framework capabilities and security libraries
- Watch out for hard-coded secrets, back doors, hand-rolled crypto!
- Leverage Static Analysis (SAST) to enforce good practices and catch common security/coding mistakes
- CAUTION: Developers need secure coding training, so they know what to look for

Peer reviews should focus on high risk code, which may perform any of following functionality (not inclusive):

- Infrastructure Code
- Pipeline definitions
- Authentication
- Access control
- Output encoding
- Input validation
- Automated security / compliance tests
- High risk business logic
- Data entitlement checks
- Handling confidential data
- Cryptography

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Code review workflow tools enforce specific manual code review workflows and make it easy to involve multiple reviewers
 - Bitbucket/GitHub/GitLab pull request comments
 - Review Board or Gerrit (open source)
 - Atlassian Crucible
 - SmartBear Code Collaborator
 - Phabricator (from Facebook)

PRE-COMMIT

PEER CODE REVIEWS

Peer Code Review Example

Gitlab pull request requiring peer review approval:

The screenshot shows a GitLab Merge Request (MR) for the project 'applications / WidgetTown'. The MR is titled 'Type name handing' and was edited 2 minutes ago. It is a request to merge the 'TypeNameHandling' branch into the 'master' branch. The interface includes a navigation bar with tabs for Project, Activity, Repository, Pipelines, Graphs, Issues (0), Merge Requests (1), and Wiki. The 'Merge Requests' tab is active. Below the title, there are buttons for 'Check out branch' and 'Download as'. A green 'Accept Merge Request' button is prominent, along with checkboxes for 'Remove source branch' and 'Modify commit message'. A note states: 'You can also accept this merge request manually using the [command line](#).' Below this are reaction buttons: a thumbs up (0), a thumbs down (0), and an 'Add' button. Further down, there are tabs for 'Discussion' (0), 'Commits' (3), and 'Changes' (18). The 'Discussion' tab is selected, showing a text area with the text 'This code change introduces a deserialization vulnerability.' and a rich text editor toolbar with options like Bold, Italic, Quote, Code, List, and Link.

Agenda


- Introduction
- Pre-Commit
- **Commit**

Commit Stage

1. **Static Code Analysis**
2. **Security Unit Testing**
3. **Container Security**
4. **Dependency Management**

DevSecOps Commit Phase

Applying automated, fast, accurate security controls in the CI pipeline:



#1 | Static Code Analysis

Static Code Analysis in the Pipeline

Limited opportunity to provide fast and clear feedback during commit and build:

- Automatically diff and scan changes, provide clear information on new findings to developers, feedback button to reject false positives
- Incremental scanning if possible – deep scanning takes too long for CI/CD, especially on large code bases.
- Run deep scans out of band
- Run scans in parallel with unit testing for speed
- Return results directly to engineers (IDE / backlog list)
- Minimize false positives by turning off rules / writing custom rules

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- FindSecurityBugs (Java)
 - <http://h3xstream.github.io/find-sec-bugs/>
- Phan (PHP)
 - <https://github.com/etsy/phan>
- NodeJsScan (JavaScript)
 - <https://github.com/ajinabraham/NodeJsScan>
- Brakeman (Ruby)
 - <http://brakemanscanner.org/>
- Bandit (Python)
 - <https://github.com/openstack/bandit>



COMMIT (CI)

STATIC CODE
ANALYSIS

Weaponizing the toolchain (continued):

- **Flawfinder (C)**
 - <http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/>
- **Puma Scan (C#)**
 - <https://github.com/pumasecurity/puma-scan>
- **Gosec (Go)**
 - <https://github.com/GoASTScanner/gas>




COMMIT (CI)

STATIC CODE
ANALYSIS

Static Code Analysis Example in CI

Invoking a scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:



The screenshot shows the Jenkins web interface for a job named 'Puma Scan'. The browser address bar shows the URL 'jenkins.pumademo.com/job/Puma Scan/1/warnings40Result/new/'. The Jenkins logo and search bar are at the top. The left sidebar contains links: 'Back to Project', 'Status', 'Changes', 'Console Output', 'Edit Build Information', 'Delete Build', and 'MSBuild Warnings'. The main content area is titled 'MSBuild Warnings - New Warnings' and includes a 'Summary' table and a 'Details' section.

Summary

Total	High Priority	Normal Priority	Low Priority
63	0	63	0

Details

Namespaces Files Categories **Warnings** Details

File	Namespace	Line	Priority	Type	Category
DataAccess.cs:25	WidgetTown.Utilites	25	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0107
RestClient.cs:99	WidgetTown.Utilites	22	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0113
AccountController.cs:95	WidgetTown.Controllers	95	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0018
AccountController.cs:208	WidgetTown.Controllers	208	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
AccountController.cs:283	WidgetTown.Controllers	283	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0109
CartController.cs:60	WidgetTown.Controllers	60	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
ContestsController.cs:38	WidgetTown.Controllers	38	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0023
ContestsController.cs:39	WidgetTown.Controllers	39	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019
ContestsController.cs:63	WidgetTown.Controllers	63	Normal	MSBuild	SEC0019

A tooltip is visible over the 'RestClient.cs:99' link, containing the text: 'SQL Injection - ADO.NET method is passed a dynamic SQL statement.'

#2 | Security Unit Testing

Take advantage of engineering teams that are “test obsessed”:

- Get off the "happy path"!!
- Leverage “Evil User Stories”, “Abuse Cases”, and OWASP ASVS requirements to come up with test cases
- Ensure high levels of unit test coverage for high risk code
- **Red means STOP** – ensure team does not ignore/remove broken tests
- Write unit tests first when fixing vulnerabilities
- Use Unit tests to alert on changes to high risk code

Security Unit Testing Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- JUnit (Java)
 - <https://junit.org>
- XUnit (C#, F#, VB)
 - <https://xunit.github.io/>
- Mocha (NodeJS)
 - <https://mochajs.org/>
- RSpec (Ruby)
 - <http://rspec.info/>
- PyUnit (Python)
 - <https://wiki.python.org/moin/PyUnit>



COMMIT (CI)

The diagram consists of two orange shapes. The top shape is a right-pointing arrow with the text 'COMMIT (CI)' inside. The bottom shape is a rectangle with the text 'SECURITY UNIT TESTING' inside. The arrow points towards the rectangle, indicating a flow from the commit to the testing phase.

SECURITY UNIT
TESTING

Security Unit Testing Example | Happy Path

The following code stays on the happy path by downloading Bob's license file:

```
1  [Theory]
2  [InlineData("bob@app.com", "L1ttleB0bbyTable$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Found)]
3  public async Task DownloadTest(string username, string password, string id,
4                                HttpStatusCode responseCode)
5  {
6      ...
7      var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, $"/download/{id}");
8      request.Headers.Add("Cookie", $"app-portal=${authCookie};");
9      var response = await _client.SendAsync(request);
10     Assert.Equal(responseCode, response.StatusCode);
11 }
```

Security Unit Testing Example | Evil Path

The following code performs an abuse case where Alice attempts to download Bob's license file:

```
1  [Theory]
2  [InlineData("bob@app.com", "L1ttleB0bbyTable$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Found)]
3  [InlineData("alice@app.com", "NotB0bbysPwd$", "1", HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)]
4  public async Task DownloadTest(string username, string password, string id,
5                                HttpStatusCode responseCode)
6  {
7      ...
8      var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, $"/download/{id}");
9      request.Headers.Add("Cookie", $"app-portal=${authCookie};");
10     var response = await _client.SendAsync(request);
11     Assert.Equal(responseCode, response.StatusCode);
12 }
```

#3 | Container Security

Container Security Issues

- Lightweight isolation (do containers contain?)
- User namespacing is not enabled by default (added in Docker 1.10 Feb 2016)
- Untrusted content, compromised, and vulnerable images
- Docker Daemon presents its own attack surface
- Container sprawl and limited visibility, especially at scale
- Ephemeral run-time is difficult to track and manage

Container Security Resources

In-depth container security discussions could be a week-long discussion. Here are some resources to keep you busy:

- Docker Security Guidelines
- Docker Reference Architecture
- CIS Docker Benchmark
- NCC Group: Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers
- NIST SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark

Container Security Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- Docker Benchmark Inspec Profile
 - <https://github.com/dev-sec/cis-docker-benchmark>
- Anchore
 - <https://anchore.com/opensource/>
- Actuary
 - <https://github.com/diogomonica/actuary>
- Clair
 - <https://github.com/coreos/clair>
- Falco
 - <https://github.com/draios/falco>

COMMIT (CI)

CONTAINER SECURITY

Container Security Example

Invoking an Anchore image scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:

[Policy](#)

Anchore Policy Evaluation Summary

Show entries Search:

Repo Tag	Stop Actions	Warn Actions	Go Actions	Final Action
docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	0	14	0	WARN

Showing 1 to 1 of 1 entries Previous **1** Next

Anchore Policy Evaluation Report

Show entries Search:

Image Id	Repo Tag	Trigger Id	Gate	Trigger	Check Output	Gate Action	Whitelisted
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	b38090bac771995c5af3fc8c033b7d3d	dockerfilecheck	nohealthcheck	Dockerfile does not contain any HEALTHCHECK instructions	WARN	false
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	CVE-2018-6829+gnupg	anchoresec	vulnmedium	MEDIUM Vulnerability found in package - gnupg (CVE-2018-6829 - http://people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2018-6829)	WARN	false
f975c50357489439eb9145dbfa16bb7cd06c02c31aa4df45c77de4d2baa4e232	docker.io/library/ubuntu:latest	CVE-2018-6829+gpgv	anchoresec	vulnmedium	MEDIUM Vulnerability found in package - gpgv (CVE-2018-6829 - http://people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2018-6829)	WARN	false

#4 | Dependency Management

Dependency Management (Component Analysis)

Serious vulnerabilities can be inherited from open source libraries, docker images, and infrastructure templates:

- Use tools to automatically scan code base or build artifacts and identify external dependencies (build a “bill of materials”)
- Identify out of date components
- Check against public vulnerability database(s) for known vulnerabilities in these components
- Many commercial tools also check for licensing risks or violations
- Caution that some tools may not check transitive dependencies within components
- Integrate into CI/CD—automatically fail build if serious problems are found

Dependency Management Tools

Weaponizing the toolchain:

- OWASP Dependency Check (Java, .NET, Ruby, Python)
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
- PHP Security Checker
 - <https://security.sensiolabs.org/>
- Bundler-Audit (Ruby)
 - <https://github.com/rubysec/bundler-audit>
- NPM Audit / Retire.JS (NodeJS)
 - <https://retirejs.github.io/retire.js/>
 - <https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/audit>

COMMIT (CI)

DEPENDENCY
MANAGEMENT

Example of Dependency Analysis in CI

Invoking a dependency check scan and capturing vulnerability data in a Jenkins CI pipeline:

DependencyCheck Result

Warnings Trend

All Warnings	New Warnings	Fixed Warnings
153	138	0

Summary


Total	High Priority	Normal Priority	Low Priority
153	24	111	18

Details

Files	Categories	Types	Warnings	Details	New	High	Normal	Low
Category					Total	Distribution		
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer					5			
CWE-134 Uncontrolled Format String					1			
CWE-189 Numeric Errors					2			
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation					7			
CWE-200 Information Exposure					5			
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')					4			
CWE-264 Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls					4			
CWE-287 Improper Authentication					2			
CWE-310 Cryptographic Issues					2			
CWE-399 Resource Management Errors					7			
CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')					4			

DevSecOps Toolchain Summary

Exploring further...



Thank you for attending!

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